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effects of defendants’ activities. Section One of the Sherman Act applies
only to agreements between two or more actors. A perplexing aspect of the
agreement requirement of Section One is that sometimes two or more
actors who are parties to an agreement are classified as one person, a
“single entity.” Since an agreement requires two or more distinct actors,
the single entity fiction precludes finding the required agreement.
Therefore, the agreements among actors within an economic unit deemed
to be a single entity are invisible for purposes of Section One. Because
these agreements within a single entity are deemed not to exist for purposes
of Section One, their competitive effects are not assessed. Therefore, the
single entity concept controls when the competitive effects of agreements
will and will not be subject to Section One scrutiny. This article (1)
analyzes the theoretical foundation of the single entity concept and (2)
proposes a sequential two-step test for determining when the preclusive
effect of the single entity concept is justified.
The first section of this article will examine the structure of the
Sherman Act, focusing on the assessment of competitive effects of
agreements under Section One. Section II will analyze the efforts of the
U.S. Supreme Court to address the limits of the single entity concept. The
Court has determined that corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries
are incapable of conspiring for purposes of Section One and that teams
forming the National Football League are separate entities unprotected by
the single entity concept.
Section III will analyze the impact of two contrasting theories of the
firm on the single entity concept. Ronald Coase’s groundbreaking 1937
essay, The Nature of the Firm, fits neatly with the single entity concept.
Coase viewed the firm as consisting of an entrepreneur and his or her
employees, and he distinguished activities within the firm from transactions
between the firm and other actors. However, the predominant view of the
firm for the last several decades has been the “nexus of contracts” concept.
The nexus of contracts concept views the firm as a web of explicit and
implicit contracts, which includes suppliers of capital, services, and goods
together with the purchasers of output. The nexus of contracts approach
downplays the distinction between suppliers of services who are employees
and suppliers who are not. It also questions whether suppliers of equity
capital are “owners” of the firm in any meaningful sense. The nexus of
contracts concept rejects the categorical distinction between activity
“inside” the Coasean firm and activity “outside” the firm.
Section IV will develop a two-stage test for determining the
boundaries of a single entity for the purposes of Section One. The test
relies on an analysis of the likelihood of incentives for efficiency. Sharing
of net profits creates incentives for efficiency, so parties who share net
profits should be part of the single entity. Persons significantly controlled
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by parties who share net profits should also be included in the single entity.
This is because the people who have the incentive to seek efficiency
control the people who lack that incentive. Finally, Section V will apply
the tests developed in the preceding section to the facts of Supreme Court
cases addressing the single entity concept.
I. THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT CONTROLS WHETHER THE
COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MOST BEHAVIOR WILL BE ANALYZED
The structure of the Sherman Act prohibits a single inquiry into
whether conduct is anticompetitive. The Act is divided into two sections,
each of which gives rise to claims with two elements. Section One
prohibits all contracts, conspiracies, and combinations which unreasonably
restrain trade.1 The first element of a claim under Section One is the
existence of an agreement between two or more actors. Evidence of an
express agreement may directly prove an agreement. Express agreements
are sometimes contained in written contracts.2 Express agreements are also
contained in rules or bylaws adopted by organizations in order to govern
the conduct of their members.3 Section One cases involving such direct
proof of agreements turn on the analysis of whether the uncontroverted
agreement is a reasonable one.
However, parties often vigorously contest the existence of an
agreement. Courts have struggled with the standard for when conduct of
the parties indicates the existence of an agreement.4 Such conduct can
occur both in the context of alleged agreements among competitors5 and in
the context of alleged agreements between buyers and sellers.6 In resolving
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979)
(recognizing that agreements can be manifested in the form of blanket license agreements).
3. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978)
(holding that a canon of ethics amounts to an agreement among competitors).
4. Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939)
(stating that knowingly participating in mutually dependent parallel behavior constitutes an
agreement), with Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-554 (2007) (determining
that interdependent parallel action among telephone companies is not enough, by itself, to
constitute an agreement), and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 76366 (1984) (discussing standards for inferring an agreement from communications between
manufacturers and distributors), and United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-07
(1919) (holding that a manufacturer’s refusals to deal with retailers, who sold its products
below a certain price, does not constitute agreements with those retailers).
5. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 214, 221 (alleging an agreement between
competitors in the film distribution business); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549, 551 (alleging an
agreement between competitors in the telephone service carrier business).
6. See, e.g., Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 755-57 (alleging an agreement between a
manufacturer of chemical herbicides and the distributers who bought the herbicides);
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 302 (alleging an agreement between a manufacturer of toiletries and
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these cases, courts analyze the reasons that concerted behavior 7 is subject
to scrutiny under Section One.
The Supreme Court has noted that:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly
than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted
activity is inherently fraught with anticompetitive risk. It
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their
own interests separately combine to act as one for their common
benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which
economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic
power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such
merging of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit
consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to
warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.8
The second element of a claim under Section One of the Sherman Act
is that the agreement unreasonably restrain trade.9 The usual test for
determining the legality of an agreement under Section One is called the
rule of reason.
The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a
practice restrains trade in violation of § 1:
Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.
Appropriate factors to take into account include “specific
information about the relevant business” and “the restraint’s
history, nature, and effect.” Whether the businesses involved
have market power is a further, significant consideration. In its
design and function the rule distinguishes between restraints with
anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and
restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best
the wholesale/retail merchants it distributed to).
7. “Concerted behavior” is a conventional shorthand for conduct amounting to an
agreement under Section One.
8. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ‘[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States.’ While § 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all
contracts, the Court has never ‘taken a literal approach to [its] language.’ Rather, the Court
has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.’”) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1; Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
10 (1997)).
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interest.10
Assessing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an agreement
under the rule of reason can be burdensome. To limit this burden, courts
assess more straightforward agreements without extensive market analysis,
under the “quick look” version of the rule of reason.11
Some categories of agreements are subject to neither the full-blown
nor the quick look version of the rule of reason. Rather, courts deem these
agreements illegal per se. Agreements subject to per se treatment include
price fixing agreements by competitors12 and agreements that allocate
markets among competitors.13 Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has
reduced the number of agreements subject to per se illegality. It has done
this by eliminating per se rules or limiting their application.14 The Court
has stated its preference for the rule of reason over per se treatment in
strong terms:
Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints, like those
mentioned, “that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.” To justify a per se prohibition
a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects, and
10. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86 (citing Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5) (quoting Cont’l T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; Copperweld, 467
U.S. at 768; Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006)).
11. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61
(1986) (explaining that a lack of elaborate market analysis does not invalidate a finding of a
violation of the rule of reason); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109, 110 n.39 (1984) (noting that the rule of reason may be
applied in the “twinkling of an eye” when anticompetitive effects are obvious); Nat’l Soc’y
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting that some agreements
are so plainly anticompetitive that an elaborate analysis is not needed). But see Cal. Dental
Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (holding that a quick look analysis
is improper where the anticompetitive effects of a given restraint are not intuitively
obvious).
12. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (“Under
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se.”).
13. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“One of the
classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the
same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.”).
14. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893-94 (establishing that per se illegality is
unwarranted for vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices because both
precompetitive and anticompetitive are possible); Khan, 522 U.S. at 18 (concluding that the
economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing is
insufficient); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 (overturning per se treatment for vertical nonprice restraints); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33
(1979) (limiting application of per se treatment only to those alleged restraints with which
the court has considerable experience).
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“lack . . . any redeeming virtue[.]”
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after
courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint
at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it
would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule
of reason[.] It should come as no surprise, then, that “we have
expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where
the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately
obvious.” And, as we have stated, a “departure from the rule-ofreason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”15
The preference for rule of reason treatment over per se rules on the
question of reasonableness is conceptually related to whether an agreement
exists at all. When a court finds an agreement per se illegal, it does not
reach the question of whether that agreement is reasonable. The Supreme
Court’s hesitance to cut off an inquiry into the facts regarding the
competitive effect of an agreement is understandable. A court will also
forego a factual inquiry into the anticompetitive effects of conduct if it
determines that an agreement does not exist. As with a per se illegality
finding, if courts find that no agreement exists under Section One, the
reasonableness question is never reached. It would be understandable if
courts would be hesitant to cut off an inquiry into the competitive effects of
conduct by concluding that an agreement is lacking.
Section Two of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and
attempted monopolization.16 A monopolization claim under Section Two
has two elements. First, the defendant must have monopoly power.
Second, the defendant must have acquired or maintained that power by
means that are deemed unlawful under Section Two.17 While an agreement
15. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886-887 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289 (1985); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50, 58-59; Khan, 522 U.S. at 10) (citing
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); Broad. Music, Inc., 441
U.S. at 9; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). The strength of the
Court’s preference for the rule of reason over per se rules is emphasized by the fact that this
quotation comes from a case in which the Court overturned a per se rule that had been in
existence for almost a century.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section Two also prohibits conspiracies to monopolize. Id.
Such conspiracies to monopolize would also be prohibited as conspiracies in unreasonable
restraint of trade under Section One.
17. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009)
(stating that the acquisition of monopoly power must have been willful, and not simply a
consequence of natural business growth or development, to be a Section Two violation). A
claim for attempted monopolization under Section Two generally requires that (1) the
defendant be dangerously close to the acquisition of monopoly power, (2) that the defendant
engage in conduct condemned under Section Two, and (3) that the defendant have the
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between two or more parties is required for a claim under Section One,
unilateral conduct is actionable under Section Two. Thus, the structure of
the Sherman Act prevents an inquiry into whether conduct is
anticompetitive, unless that conduct is either the product of an agreement
or is undertaken by a defendant who either has or is dangerously close to
acquiring monopoly power. Unilateral conduct undertaken by a defendant,
who neither has nor is close to acquiring monopoly power, is legal under
the Act without regard to whether that conduct is procompetitive or
anticompetitive.
Since relatively few firms have monopoly power or are dangerously
close to acquiring it, the agreement question under Section One controls
whether courts can assess the competitive effects of business behavior in
the vast majority of situations. If an agreement is present, courts typically
apply the rule of reason to determine whether challenged behavior is net
procompetitive or anticompetitive. In relatively few settings, courts will
apply per se rules to condemn agreements. If an agreement is not present,
a court cannot assess the competitive effects of the challenged behavior
under Section One. The presence of an agreement is a threshold that must
be crossed before the competitive effects of business behavior can be
analyzed under Section One.
A perplexing question arises in the application of the agreement
requirement that goes to the heart of the two-section division of the
Sherman Act. Are there instances in which the concerted conduct of two or
more parties should be deemed that of a single actor and thus shielded from
scrutiny under Section One? The behavior could potentially be examined
under Section Two, but only if the defendant had or was close to having
monopoly power. The law unequivocally allows the fiction of a single
entity to shield multiple actors within a firm under Section One. No matter
how many shareholders, directors, and employees a single firm has, The
Sherman Act treats them as a single person. Their meetings, memoranda,
emails, and conversations about the firm’s business are deemed unilateral
actions automatically lawful under Section One. This conclusion is a legal
fiction. Owners, managers, and employees of a firm are distinct natural
persons. If they agree together to sell illegal drugs or commit a murder,
they are guilty of criminal conspiracy. However, the policy of the Sherman
Act protects the competitive consequences of their conduct within the firm
from assessment under Section One. This article analyzes the rationale of
this rule.

specific intent to monopolize. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S 447, 456
(1993).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FICTION OF THE SINGLE ENTITY
The Supreme Court has addressed the single entity fiction in two
cases. In one of these cases, the Court concluded that single entity
treatment was appropriate, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Stevens. In
the other, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in a unanimous
decision authored by Justice Stevens.
A. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries Are Part of the Parent Corporation
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., a new entrant to a
market sued several defendants for conspiring to impede its entry.18 The
defendants included a parent corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary, and
a potential supplier to the plaintiff. The jury determined that the potential
supplier had not joined the conspiracy.19 This left the parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary as the only two potential participants in
the conspiracy. The jury had been instructed that a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary were sometimes capable of conspiring under
Section One of the Sherman Act, and the jury concluded that such a
conspiracy existed.20 Thus, the question before the Court on appeal was
whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary could
conspire under Section One.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court acknowledged that
earlier rulings indicated that parent corporations and wholly owned
subsidiaries were capable of conspiring under Section One. Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that this “problem”21 began with United States v. Yellow
Cab Co.22 Yellow Cab involved an alleged conspiracy among an individual
and several corporations he controlled. The case contains broad language
suggesting that the corporate affiliations of alleged conspirators are
irrelevant to the question of whether a conspiracy exists.23 The Copperweld
18. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 755-57 (1984).
19. Id. at 757-58.
20. Id. at 757-58, 759 n.2.
21. Id. at 760.
22. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
23. See id. at 227-228 (“The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or absence
of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily
from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership as
from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent. Similarly, any affiliation or
integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the
sanctions which Congress has imposed. The corporate interrelationships of the conspirators,
in other words, are not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is
aimed at substance rather than form.
And so in this case, the common ownership and control of the various corporate
appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the impact
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Court acknowledged Yellow Cab’s suggestion, but found that corporate
affiliation was only irrelevant when considering the original acquisition of
a corporation, not its subsequent operation:
It has long been clear that a pattern of acquisitions may itself
create a combination illegal under § 1, especially when an
original anticompetitive purpose is evident from the affiliated
corporations’ subsequent conduct. The Yellow Cab passage is
most fairly read in light of this settled rule. In Yellow Cab, the
affiliation of the defendants was irrelevant because the original
acquisitions were themselves illegal.24
The Court in Copperweld found that subsequent cases expanded
Yellow Cab’s holding, thereby supporting the broader proposition that
parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries were capable of
conspiring under Section One beyond the potentially illegal original
acquisition:
The ambiguity of the Yellow Cab holding yielded the one case
giving support to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. In
Kiefer–Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., the Court
held that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a liquor distiller were
guilty under § 1 of the Sherman Act for jointly refusing to supply
a wholesaler who declined to abide by a maximum resale pricing
scheme. The Court offhandedly dismissed the defendants’
argument that “their status as ‘mere instrumentalities of a single
manufacturing-merchandizing unit’ makes it impossible for them
to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act.”
With only a citation to Yellow Cab and no further analysis, the
Court stated that the “suggestion runs counter to our past
decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate
corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws” and stated that
this rule was “especially applicable” when defendants “hold
themselves out as competitors.”
Unlike the Yellow Cab passage, this language does not pertain
to corporations whose initial affiliation was itself unlawful.25

of the Act. The complaint charges that the restraint of interstate trade was not only effected
by the combination of the appellees but was the primary object of the combination. The
theory of the complaint, to borrow language from United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S.
26, 57, is that ‘dominating power’ over the cab operating companies ‘was not obtained by
normal expansion to meet the demands of a business growing as a result of superior and
enterprising management, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control.’ If that theory
is borne out in this case by the evidence, coupled with proof of an undue restraint of
interstate trade, a plain violation of the Act has occurred.”) (internal citation omitted)).
24. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 761 (internal footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 763-764 (internal footnote and citation omitted).
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However, the Court concluded that Yellow Cab, Kiefer-Stewart, and
other cases involving alleged conspiracies among affiliated corporations26
did not prevent reconsideration of the issue: “In short, while this Court has
previously seemed to acquiesce in the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,
it has never explored or analyzed in detail the justifications for such a rule;
the doctrine has played only a relatively minor role in the Court’s Sherman
Act holdings.”27
The Court began reconsidering whether parent corporations and their
wholly owned subsidiaries were capable of conspiring under Section One
by describing the difference between the two sections of the Sherman Act.
“The Sherman Act contains a ‘basic distinction between concerted and
independent action.’ The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone
and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.”28 The Court
explained that limited coverage of unilateral conduct under the Act was
motivated by a concern over false positives; in other words, courts would
erroneously proscribe procompetitive conduct:
In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects,
Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only
when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral
conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will
dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive
entrepreneur.29
The Court explained its stricter assessment of concerted behavior in a
well-known passage setting forth the reasons concerted behavior raises
competitive concerns:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly
than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted
activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their
own interests separately are combining to act as one for their
common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in
26. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951)
(holding that agreements providing for an aggregation of trade restraints are illegal under
the Act and the fact that the agreement was created pursuant to a joint venture will not save
it); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968) (holding that
even common ownership cannot save the parties from the legal obligations imposed on
separate entities).
27. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 766.
28. Id. at 767 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984)) (internal footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 767-68.
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which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the
economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course,
such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that
benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient
to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.30
The Court went on to address whether officers and employees of a
corporation represent separate actors. The Court reasoned that the
language of Section One does not foreclose treating officers and employees
of a single firm as actors capable of conspiracy. But the Court found that
such a reading was not supported by the policy underlying the Sherman
Act:
Nothing in the literal meaning of [Section One] excludes
coordinated conduct among officers or employees of the same
company. But it is perfectly plain that an internal “agreement” to
implement a single, unitary firm’s policies does not raise the
antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police. The officers of
a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate
economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly
bring together economic power that was previously pursuing
divergent goals.31
Under this view, officers and employees of a single firm are not
capable of conspiring because they are pursing the interests of the firm
rather than their own interests. The Court went on to explain that a
corporation that groups its officers and employees into unincorporated
divisions does nothing to alter this result.32
The Court then addressed whether it should treat wholly owned
subsidiaries differently. The Court concluded that it would not:
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity
of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their
general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two
separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike
a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a
single driver. With or without a formal “agreement,” the
subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.
If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do “agree” to a course
of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that
had previously served different interests, and there is no
justification for § 1 scrutiny.33
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
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Thus, although Section One authorizes scrutiny of mergings of
interests, further scrutiny is forbidden once those interests are merged.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in
Copperweld. He cautioned against overturning precedent and argued that
the majority had erroneously minimized the holdings of earlier cases.34
Justices Stevens also relied on the breadth of the statutory language
addressing the agreement requirement.35 He argued that the statutory
language reflected a common law context in which legally separate persons
were capable of conspiring together.36 The statute’s expressed concern
with trusts also informed his position, because that concern also addressed
affiliated corporations.37
Justice Stevens concluded that a parent and subsidiary are capable of
conspiring under Section One by relying on policy that distinguishes
between two different types of internal agreements: those which solely
eliminate competition between agreeing parties and those which tend to
exclude competitors. Price fixing is an example of the first type of
34. See id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the rule announced today is
inconsistent with what this Court has held on at least seven previous occasions.”).
35. See id. at 784-785 (“The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is sweeping in its
breadth: ‘Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, . . . is declared to be illegal.’ This
Court has long recognized that Congress intended this language to have a broad sweep,
reaching any form of combination: ‘[I]n view of the many new forms of contracts and
combinations which were being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed
essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of contract or
combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought
about could save such restraint from condemnation. The statute under this view evidenced
the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from
combination or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but
to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether old or new, which
would constitute an interference that is an undue restraint.’”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1;
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911)).
36. See id. at 785-86 (“Since the statute was written against the background of the
common law, reference to the common law is particularly enlightening in construing the
statutory requirement of a ‘contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy.’ Under the common law, the question whether affiliated corporations constitute
a plurality of actors within the meaning of the statute is easily answered. The well-settled
rule is that a corporation is a separate legal entity; the separate corporate form cannot be
disregarded. The Congress that passed the Sherman Act was well acquainted with this rule.
Thus it has long been the law of criminal conspiracy that the officers of even a single
corporation are capable of conspiring with each other or the corporation. This Court has
held that a corporation can conspire with its employee, and that a labor union can ‘combine’
with its business agent within the meaning of § 1.”) (internal citation and footnotes omitted).
37. See id. at 787 (“Holding that affiliated corporations cannot constitute a plurality of
actors is also inconsistent with the objectives of the Sherman Act. Congress was
particularly concerned with ‘trusts,’ hence it named them in § 1 as a specific form of
‘combination’ at which the statute was directed. Yet ‘trusts’ consisted of affiliated
corporations.”).
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agreement.38 Boycotts39 and exclusive dealing arrangements40 are examples
of the second type. Justice Stevens argued that agreements eliminating
competition between a parent corporation and its subsidiary should be
legal:
The Court’s reason for rejecting the concept of a combination or
conspiracy among a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary is that it elevates form over substance — while in form
the two corporations are separate legal entities, in substance they
are a single integrated enterprise and hence cannot comprise the
plurality of actors necessary to satisfy § 1. In many situations the
Court’s reasoning is perfectly sensible, for the affiliation of
corporate entities often is procompetitive precisely because, as
the Court explains, it enhances efficiency. A challenge to
conduct that is merely an incident of the desirable integration that
accompanies such affiliation should fail.41
However, Justice Stevens argued that an agreement between a parent
corporation and its subsidiary that tends to exclude rivals should potentially
be illegal under Section One. He used the Copperweld facts to demonstrate
his point:
In this case, it may be that notices to potential suppliers of
respondent emanating from Copperweld carried more weight
than would notices coming only from Regal. There was evidence
suggesting that Regal and Copperweld were not integrated, and
that the challenged agreement had little to do with achieving
procompetitive efficiencies and much to do with protecting
Regal’s market position. The Court does not even try to explain
why their common ownership meant that Copperweld and Regal
were merely obtaining benefits associated with the efficiencies of
integration. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
38. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982) (“We have not
wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing.”).
39. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (“Group
boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to
be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved by allegations that they were
reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they ‘fixed or
regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in
quality.’ Even when they operated to lower prices or temporarily to stimulate competition
they were banned. For, as this Court said in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, ‘such
agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.’) (internal
citations omitted).
40. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)
(“Standard’s use of the [exclusive requirement] contracts creates just such a potential clog
on competition as it was the purpose of § 3 [of the Clayton Act] to remove wherever, were it
to become actual, it would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity.”).
41. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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thought that their agreement had a very different result — that it
raised barriers to entry and imposed an appreciable marketwide
restraint. The Court’s discussion of the justifications for
corporate affiliation is therefore entirely abstract — while it
dutifully lists the procompetitive justifications for corporate
affiliation, it fails to explain how any of them relate to the
conduct at issue in this case. What is challenged here is not the
fact of integration between Regal and Copperweld, but their
specific agreement with respect to Independence.
That
agreement concerned the exclusion of Independence from the
market, and not any efficiency resulting from integration. The
facts of this very case belie the conclusion that affiliated
corporations are incapable of engaging in the kind of conduct that
threatens marketwide competition.42
Justice Stevens believed that the Court improperly adopted a rule of
per se legality for agreements between parent corporations and their
subsidiaries.
He argued that the rule of reason could separate
procompetitive integration from anticompetitive exclusion.43
B. Teams in a Professional Sports League Are Separate Actors
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the members of
the National Football League (“NFL”) argued that they were a single entity
for purposes of Section One and were therefore incapable of conspiring
with each other.44 The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two
independently owned teams.45 Each of these firms owns the intellectual
42. Id. at 795-96.
43. See id. at 778 (“It is safe to assume that corporate affiliates do not vigorously
compete with one another. A price-fixing or market-allocation agreement between two or
more such corporate entities does not, therefore, eliminate any competition that would
otherwise exist. It makes no difference whether such an agreement is labeled a ‘contract,’ a
‘conspiracy,’ or merely a policy decision, because it surely does not unreasonably restrain
competition within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The Rule of Reason has always given
the courts adequate latitude to examine the substance rather than the form of an arrangement
when answering the question whether collective action has restrained competition within the
meaning of § 1.
Today the Court announces a new per se rule: a wholly owned subsidiary is
incapable of conspiring with its parent under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Instead of redefining
the word ‘conspiracy,’ the Court would be better advised to continue to rely on the Rule of
Reason. Precisely because they do not eliminate competition that would otherwise exist but
rather enhance the ability to compete, restraints which enable effective integration between a
corporate parent and its subsidiary — the type of arrangement the Court is properly
concerned with protecting — are not prohibited by § 1. Thus, the Court’s desire to shield
such arrangements from antitrust liability provides no justification for the Court’s new
rule.”).
44. (Am. Needle II) 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010).
45. Id. at 2207.
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property in their team names and trademarks. For many years, teams
licensed their intellectual property separately. In 1963, the members of the
NFL formed National Football League Properties (“NFLP”) to license the
intellectual properties owned by the teams.46 Each team has the power to
withdraw from NFLP. The revenue generated by NFLP is shared by the
teams equally or given to charity.47 Until 2000, NFLP licensed the
intellectual property of the teams to multiple apparel manufacturers,
allowing the licensees to use the team marks on various products. NFLP
had granted American Needle one of these licenses. In 2000, the members
of the NFL voted to change the licensing policy of NFLP. Instead of
granting multiple nonexclusive licenses to apparel vendors, the members
voted to cause NFLP to grant a series of exclusive licenses. Pursuant to
this policy, NFLP granted an exclusive ten-year license to Reebok
International Ltd. to manufacture hats using the trademarks of the NFL
team members.48 Since the license to Reebok was exclusive, NFLP could
not renew American Needle’s license to manufacture hats.
American Needle sued, alleging violations of Section One and Section
Two of the Sherman Act. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, concluding that the NFL was a single entity with respect to
the challenged conduct.49 In doing so, the court discussed the various
procompetitive reasons that could justify the NFL’s decision to use a joint
licensing entity. The court recognized “that supposed efficiencies in
economic arrangements are more the stuff of the rule of reason than of
distinguishing between single entities and joint ventures.”50 However,
rather than analyze these efficiencies under the rule of reason, the court
concluded that American Needle’s Section One claims should be
summarily disposed of by accepting the single entity argument made by the
NFL.
The Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Stevens, the Court held that the members of the NFL were not
protected by the single entity concept, but rather were separate actors
capable of conspiring for purposes of Section One.51 In his analysis, Justice
Stevens returned to the history of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
that he had found so persuasive in his dissent in Copperweld.52 He
concluded that the majority in Copperweld focused on substance rather

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints (Am. Needle I), 496 F. Supp. 2d 941,
944 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
50. Id. at 944.
51. Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2212.
52. Id. at 2210-11.
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than form.53
In searching for a test for conspiracy under Section One, Justice
Stevens turned to language from Copperweld that focused on whether the
decisionmakers were “separate” and “independent”:
The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination. . . , or
conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins
together separate decisionmakers.
The relevant inquiry,
therefore, is whether there is a “contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy” amongst “separate economic actors pursuing
separate economic interests,” such that the agreement “deprives
the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,” and
therefore of “diversity of entrepreneurial interests,” and thus of
actual or potential competition[.]54
Justice Stevens also drew from Copperweld a concern about the
separateness and independence of the decision makers and the separateness
of the economic interests and sources of economic power:
Thus, while the president and a vice president of a firm could
(and regularly do) act in combination, their joint action generally
is not the sort of “combination” that § 1 is intended to cover.
Such agreements might be described as “really unilateral
behavior flowing from decisions of a single enterprise.” Nor, for
this reason, does § 1 cover “internally coordinated conduct of a
corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions,” because “[a]
division within a corporate structure pursues the common
interests of the whole,” and therefore “coordination between a
corporation and its division does not represent a sudden joining
of two independent sources of economic power previously
pursuing separate interests[.]” Nor, for the same reasons, is “the
coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary”
covered. They “have a complete unity of interest” and thus
“[w]ith or without a formal ‘agreement,’ the subsidiary acts for
the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.” . . .
The question is whether the agreement joins together
“independent centers of decisionmaking.”55
Applying a standard based on separateness of decision making,
economic power, and objectives, Justice Stevens concluded that the
members of the NFL were capable of conspiring for purposes of Section
53. Id. at 2211.
54. Id. at 2212 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
769 (1984); Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002)) (citing
Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2003)).
55. Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767, 770-71).
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One:
The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic
power characteristic of independent action. Each of [the teams]
is a substantial, independently owned [and] independently
managed business, whose “general corporate actions are guided
or determined” by “separate corporate consciousnesses,” and
whose “objectives are” not “common.”56
The Court found that the league members were at least potential
competitors in licensing the teams’ trademarks and that in licensing they
were pursuing their separate economic interests.57
The NFL made a series of arguments contending that the teams had
integrated their operations sufficiently to justify single entity treatment.
The Court rejected each of these arguments. Although the league
members’ common goal in promoting the NFL brand partially aligned their
interests, the Court noted that “the teams still have distinct, potentially
competing interests.”58 The NFL argued metaphorically that NFLP was the
driver of a promotional vehicle pursuing the common interests of league
members. The Court rejected this argument as well, responding that
“illegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to the
restraint, at the expense of those who are not parties.”59 Justice Stevens
noted that a history of cooperation may merely manifest an anticompetitive
agreement.60 The NFL argued that cooperation was essential to the creation
of the product being sold. But the Court responded that while the necessity
of cooperation should be included in the analysis of an agreement under the
Rule of Reason, it does not necessarily justify single entity treatment.61
Justice Stevens acknowledged that decisions made by NFLP were not
exactly the same as decisions made directly through agreements among the
league members, especially since NFLP had its own management and the
league members shared NFLP’s revenues.62 However, Justice Stevens
reasoned that each league member owned its separate trademarks and,
without the cooperative activity coordinated through NFLP, each of the
teams was a potential competitor in the licensing of their trademarks. 63
56. Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771).
57. Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2213.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2213-14.
61. Id. at 2214.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 2214-15 (“Nevertheless we think it clear that for the same reasons the 32
teams’ conduct is covered by § 1, NFLP’s actions also are subject to § 1, at least with
regards to its marketing of property owned by the separate teams. NFLP’s licensing
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While courts usually treat actors in a single corporation as a single entity,
Justice Stevens believed that single entity treatment was inappropriate in
this case because each of the teams were acting to further their separate
interests:
Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted
action covered by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act on
interests separate from those of the firm itself, and the intrafirm
agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing
concerted action.
For that reason, decisions by the NFLP regarding the teams’
separately owned intellectual property constitute concerted
action. Thirty-two teams operating independently through the
vehicle of the NFLP are not like the components of a single firm
that act to maximize the firm’s profits. The teams remain
separately controlled, potential competitors with economic
interests that are distinct from NFLP’s financial well-being.64
Justice Stevens believed that a joint venture in which the participants
shared profits and losses could merely be a way of running a cartel of
potential competitors:
If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or losses
from a venture meant that the venture was immune from § 1, then
any cartel “could evade the antitrust law simply by creating a
‘joint venture’ to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing
products.” “So long as no agreement,” other than one made by
the cartelists sitting on the board of the joint venture, “explicitly
listed the prices to be charged, the companies could act as
monopolies through the ‘joint venture.’” (Indeed, a joint venture
with a single management structure is generally a better way to
operate a cartel because it decreases the risks of a party to an
illegal agreement defecting from that agreement).65
III. THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND THE SINGLE ENTITY CONCEPT
The conceptual division of labor between the two sections of the
Sherman Act depends on a reliable distinction between acts of a single firm
(Section Two) and the coordinated actions of multiple firms (Section One).
decisions are made by the 32 potential competitors, and each of them actually owns its share
of the jointly managed assets. Apart from their agreement to cooperate in exploiting those
assets, including their decisions as the NFLP, there would be nothing to prevent each of the
teams from making its own market decisions relating to purchases of apparel and headwear,
to the sale of such items, and to the granting of licenses to use its trademarks.”).
64. Id. at 2215 (internal footnote and citations omitted).
65. Id. (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment)).
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This distinction requires a definition of what constitutes a single firm.
Generations of economists and business associations scholars, including
Ronald Coase, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, have struggled to
formulate this definition.
A. Coase Views the Firm as Distinct From the Market
In his famous 1937 essay The Nature of the Firm,66 Nobel laureate
Ronald Coase pondered what constitutes a firm and why firms exist. His
conclusions provide a meaningful foundation for the conceptual division
between Section One and Section Two of the Sherman Act. Coase began
by asking why firms exist at all. If market transactions allow individuals to
exchange goods and services at market clearing prices, why do groups of
individuals exist as firms? Coase states:
An economist thinks of the economic system as being
coordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an
organisation but an organism. The economic system “works
itself.” This does not mean that there is no planning by
individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between
alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the
system. But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is
dependent directly on the price mechanism. Indeed, it is often
considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely
tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.67
Within a firm, resources are allocated by direction rather than by
market transactions. Goods move from worker to worker on an assembly
line without negotiation as to quantity, quality, and price. No offer or
acceptance occurs. Different workers provide services to accomplish the
firm’s goals without service contracts between those workers. Factory
workers, sales associates, accountants, and in-house lawyers all coordinate
their efforts without contracting with each other. This stands in stark
contrast to a classical market as the intermediary between economic actors.
Within a firm, the [market transaction] description does not fit at
all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation
of factors of production between different uses is determined by
the price mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X
than in Y. As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference
between the prices in X and Y, except in so far as it compensates
for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real
world, we find that there are many areas where this does not
apply. If a workman moves from department Y to department X,
66. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
67. Id. at 387 (internal footnotes omitted).
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he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because
he is ordered to do so. Those who object to economic planning
on the grounds that the problem is solved by price movements
can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our
economic system which is quite different from the individual
planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally
called economic planning. The example given above is typical of
a large sphere in our modern economic system.68
The first task Coase undertakes is to explain why firms exist if market
transactions are available.69 Coase then goes on to explain what determines
the size of each firm.70 In explaining why firms exist, Coase identifies the
costs of using market transactions. The first cost he identifies “is that of
discovering what the relevant prices are.”71 Moving goods and services
within a firm avoids this cost by avoiding market transactions, and
therefore avoiding the need to determine a market price. The second cost
of market transactions Coase identifies is the cost of negotiating each
contract.72 Here, Coase acknowledges that contracts exist within firms as
well as outside of them. For example, suppliers of labor contract with the
firm by agreeing to follow the direction of the purchaser, subject to certain
limits. Within these limits, the purchaser may direct the activities of the
supplier and by this mechanism coordinate the activities of the firm.73
Coase analyzes the possibility of using long-term supply contracts as
an alternative to forming a firm. Like forming a firm, long-term supply
68. Id. at 387-388.
69. See id. at 388 (“But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination
will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organisation necessary? Why are there
these ‘islands of conscious power’? Outside the firm, price movements direct production,
which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a
firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market
structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who
directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production.
Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production
could be carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any
organisation?”).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
71. Coase, supra note 66, at 390 (internal footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 390-391.
73. See id. at 391 (“It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but
they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to
make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as
would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of
the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage, it is
important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed
within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain
limits. The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the
entrepreneur. Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.”).
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contracts reduce transaction costs by reducing the number of contracts to
negotiate and form. Coase’s assessment of this possibility speaks to the
idea of bounded rationality, which states, among other things, that at the
time of contract formation, the parties do not know what the future holds. 74
Coase addresses the possibility that, in the future, the purchaser might want
to specify which of several courses of action the seller should take:
Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period
of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the
less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person
purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected
to do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the person
supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of
action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or
commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of these
several courses he will want the supplier to take.75
Coase identifies one solution to this problem, noting that the contract
may allocate to the purchaser the power to specify later how the seller is to
perform.76 Coase then notes that as the power of control contractually
allocated to the purchaser increases, a firm comes into existence: “When
the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes
dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a ‘firm’
may be obtained. A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where
a very short term contract would be unsatisfactory.”77
Coase then asks why any market transactions exist in a world where
firms can reduce or eliminate the cost of those transactions.78 What is the
point at which a firm decides to use a market transaction rather than
coordinate one more activity within the firm? In modern terms, when will
Toyota decide to buy sparkplugs rather than make them, or retain a law
firm for a legal matter rather than use its in house legal staff? Coase
discusses three reasons why the scope of a firm could be limited, even if all
tasks that need to be accomplished were of the same type.79 First, as a firm

74. Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
75. Id. at 391.
76. Id. at 392.
77. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
78. See id. at 394 (“A pertinent question to ask would appear to be . . . . why, if by
organising one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there
any market transactions at all? Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?”).
79. Coase acknowledges that market transactions are highly variable. Id. at 396. This
of course means that some types of transactions might be cheaper to organize within a firm,
while others are especially suited to market transactions. Coase notes that this would
explain the division of tasks between intra-firm coordination and market transactions.
However, he further notes that it would not explain why more than one firm coordinating
tasks suitable to intra- firm coordination would exist. Id.
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attempts to coordinate more transactions, the cost per transaction may
increase.80 If an entrepreneur has to pay attention to more and more steps
in production, the cost of coordinating incremental steps may rise. Second,
as a firm attempts to coordinate more transactions with the firm, it may
become less effective.81 The entrepreneur may make more mistakes when
paying attention to more steps in production. Finally, as a firm gets larger,
suppliers of inputs, whose activities need to be coordinated within the firm,
may raise their prices.82 These suppliers may charge more if their activities
are part of the purchasing firm than if they are purchased in a market
transaction. This is because suppliers of these inputs may prefer to operate
their own firms rather than be controlled by a larger firm.83
Coase suggests variables that would alter the costs of intra-firm
coordination compared to market transactions. He explains that geographic
distance, task variability, and market price volatility would all increase the
cost of organizing transactions with a firm.84 Technological innovation
could affect the relative costs of intra-firm coordination versus market
transactions. Coase notes the telephone and telegraph as inventions that
reduced the cost of a firm organizing tasks at a great distance.85 Coase
would likely agree that today’s email, video conferencing, and remote
computer file access do the same. Coase makes the point that inventions
can affect both the cost of intra-firm coordination and market transactions.
It is the relative size of these effects that impacts the optimally efficient
size of the firm.86 For example, computer-aided manufacturing allows
cheaper coordination within a firm by decreasing the variability of
transactions. It allows a high level of confidence that repetition of a
manufacturing process will be uniform.
However, computer-aided
manufacturing allows cheaper market transactions for the same reason. A
buyer of a manufactured part can look at a sample of the part for sale by a
supplier and have a high degree of confidence that the parts delivered will
be of the same quality.
Thus, Coase’s explanations of why firms exist at all and why they are
not infinitely large still hold true in the modern world. Firms exist because
coordination within a firm avoids costs associated with market transactions.
Firms are not infinitely large because coordination within a firm costs more
as the firm gets larger. Firms increase in size until the point where the
costs of market transactions equal the costs of coordinating more
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 394.
Id. at 394-395.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395, n.1.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at n.3.
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transactions with the firm.87
Coase limited his task to explaining why firms exist and how large
they become. In doing so, he assumed that an entrepreneur ran the firm.
Thus, the Coasean firm consists of the entrepreneur and his or her
employees. It excludes suppliers and customers with whom the firm
interacts in markets. Although this construction of the firm focuses on the
boundary between the firm and the market, it does not try to explain the
boundaries of the firm when more than one individual assumes the
functions of the entrepreneur. The modern nexus of contracts construction
of business associations both questions the boundary between the firm and
the market and attempts to explain the fracture of the entrepreneurial
functions.
B. The Nexus of Contracts Concept Denies the Separation of the Firm
From the Market
The entrepreneur-owner performs multiple functions. He or she
supplies the capital, bears the risk of losing the capital,88 receives any
profits the business earns, and manages the business. There is no reason
why only one person must assume these tasks. In a partnership, more than
one person shares each of these tasks.89 Partnership default rules provide
that the partners share financial risks, benefits, and management
responsibilities.90 In a corporation, financial risks and benefits are allocated
to the shareholders while management tasks are allocated to the directors
and officers.91 The modern law of business associations defines and
controls these different roles. For the past several decades, the prevailing
explanation of business associations has been the nexus of contracts
theory.92 The nexus of contracts theory does not conceive of the firm as an
entity separate from the market. Rather, it views people performing the
various parts of the entrepreneurial function along with suppliers,
87. For a comparison of the decision to form a firm to the decision to form a joint
venture between firms from a Coasean perspective, see 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 5-7 (2d ed. 2005).
88. In a sole proprietorship, the entrepreneur also bears the risk of losing his or her
assets in addition to the invested capital.
89. Similarly, in a member-managed limited liability company, members who also
manage the firm share financial risks and benefits.
90. Uniform Partnership Act §§ 401, 807, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001).
91. Model Business Corporation Act § 801 (2010). Of course, the same individual
may, but need not, be a shareholder, a director, and an officer.
92. For examples of works that advance this theory, see, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 391 (2000); and William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining
Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982).
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employees, and customers as participating in a nexus of explicit and
implicit contracts.
The nexus of contracts approach originated in a famous article by
Michael Jensen and William Meckling. In Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,93 Jensen and Meckling
address how explicit and implicit contracts affect cooperation in
production.94 Cooperation in production takes the form of one person
acting for another, including situations where two or more people act for
their joint benefit. Jensen and Meckling use the term “agency” for this
concept and address the cost of agency relationships:
We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best
interests of the principal.95
Jensen and Meckling note that agency relationships and agency costs exist
in many settings.96 The focus of their article is on the agency relationship
between owners and managers of corporations. As a foundation for
addressing this subset of agency issues, the authors discuss the nature of the
firm as a nexus of contracts: “Contractual relations are the essence of the
firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc.
The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these
contracts. . . .”97 Jensen and Meckling emphasize that the fictional
personhood of a business organization should not distract from seeing the
web of explicit and implicit contracts among members of the cooperating
group:
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply
legal fictions, which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting
93. 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
94. Id. at 307-310.
95. Id. at 308.
96. See id. at 309 (“The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were
maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all
cooperative efforts — at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual
companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in
relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the
performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the
form which agency costs take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations
differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of
organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally.”)
(internal footnotes omitted).
97. Id. at 310.
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relationships among individuals. . . . The private corporation or
firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus
for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by
the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash
flows of the organization which can generally be sold without
permission of the other contracting individuals. While this
definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing
the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations
focuses attention on a crucial set of questions — why particular
sets of contractual relations arise for various types of
organizations, what the consequences of these contractual
relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to
the organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to
try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any
other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it.
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex
relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm)
and the owners of labor, material, and capital inputs and the
consumers of output.98
The final two sentences distinguish the nexus of contracts approach
from Coase’s theory of the firm.99 Coase explicitly sets out to distinguish
the inside of the firm from the outside of the firm. Inside the firm, the
entrepreneur directs the activities of the employees. Outside the firm,
market transactions take place between the firm and other actors. The
nexus of contracts approach rejects the categorical distinction between
actors inside the firm and actors outside the firm. Instead, it posits that
suppliers of goods, money, risk bearing, management, and labor, together
with purchasers of the output, are part of a web of explicit and implicit
contracts.
Jensen and Meckling agree with the earlier work of Armen Alchian
and Harold Demsetz in rejecting a focus on the entrepreneur’s control of
employees as the distinguishing characteristic of a firm.100 In Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization,101 Alchian and Demsetz
develop a theory of the firm that focuses on the role of the entrepreneur as
the supplier of capital and management. The entrepreneur is the center of a

98. Id. at 310-311 (internal footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
99. On the distinction between the Coasean approach to the firm and the nexus of
contracts theory, see Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-Of-Contracts
Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as
Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1256-1264 (2012).
100. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 93, at 310 (“Alchian and Demsetz . . . object to
the notion that activities within the firm are governed by authority, and correctly emphasize
the role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange.”).
101. 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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group of contracts and monitors the relative value of each of the inputs.102
As a foundation for this analysis, the authors deny the importance of an
employer’s control over the employee:
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to
settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action
superior to that available in the conventional market. This is
delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power
of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the
slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any
two people. I can “punish” you only by withholding future
business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to
honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all that any
employer can do. He can fire or sue, just as I can fire my grocer
by stopping purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty
products. What then is the content of the presumed power to
manage and assign workers to various tasks? Exactly the same as
one little consumer’s power to manage and assign his grocer to
various tasks. The single consumer can assign his grocer to the
task of obtaining whatever the customer can induce the grocer to
provide at a price acceptable to both parties. That is precisely all
that an employer can do to an employee. To speak of managing,
directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive
way of noting that the employer continually is involved in
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to
both parties. Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to
file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand
of tuna rather than that brand of bread.103
Thus, Alchian and Demsetz, as well as Jensen and Meckling, reject treating
the employee/employer relationship as categorically different from
relationships of others in a web of contracts because of the control
exercised by the employer. In this way, the nexus of contracts approach is
different from Coase’s theory of the firm.104
The nexus of contracts approach differs from the Coasean approach in
another respect as well. Coase viewed the firm as consisting of
entrepreneur and his or her employees. He did not address the boundaries
of the firm where multiple individuals assume the entrepreneurial
functions.
The entrepreneur provides capital, risk bearing, and
management. In 1980, Eugene Fama responded to the work of Jensen,
Meckling, Alchian, and Demsetz by arguing that they did not pay enough

102. Id. at 778.
103. Id. at 777.
104. See also O’Kelley, supra note 99, at 1262 (explaining that the nexus of contracts
approach includes, within the firm, more actors than the Coasean approach).
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attention to the separation of the entrepreneurial functions.105 Alchian and
Demsetz defined the classical firm as:
a contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several
input owners; 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of
the joint inputs; 4) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s
contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 5)
who holds the residual claim; and 6) who has the right to sell his
central contractual residual status. The central agent is called the
firm’s owner and the employer.106
Fama argues that it is important to recognize the conceptual separation of
items 3 and 4 from items 5 and 6 on the Alchian and Demsetz list:
To understand the modern corporation, it is better to separate the
manager, the agents of points 3 and 4 of the Alchian-Demsetz
definition of the firm, from the risk bearer described in points 5
and 6. The rationale for separating these functions is not just that
the end result is more descriptive of the corporation, a point
recognized in both the Alchian-Demsetz and Jensen-Meckling
papers. The major loss in retaining the concept of the
entrepreneur is that one is prevented from developing a
perspective on management and risk bearing as separate factors
of production, each faced with a market for its services that
provides alternative opportunities and, in the case of
management, motivation toward performance.107
Fama argues that the risk bearing function is just one of many inputs
of production that are parts of the nexus of contracts. Performing the risk
bearing function and being the residual claimant is not the equivalent of
owning the firm. “We first set aside the typical presumption that a
corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. . . . [T]he two functions
usually attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are
treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a
firm.”108 Fama exemplifies the nexus of contracts approach by pointing out
that owning a firm and owning securities in a firm are distinct concepts:
[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with ownership of
the firm. Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm
is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to
create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared
among inputs.
In this “nexus of contracts” perspective,
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. Dispelling the
105. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 289 (1980).
106. Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 101, at 794.
107. Fama, supra note 105, at 291.
108. Id. at 289.
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tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders is
important because it is a first step toward understanding that
control over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily the province of
the security holders.109
In summary, the nexus of contracts theory of the firm differs from that
set forth by Coase in two respects. First, Coase focused on a boundary of
the firm that separated it from market transactions with others. The
entrepreneur and his or her employees were inside the firm. Suppliers and
customers were outside the firm. The nexus of contracts theory does not
adopt this distinction; instead, it adopts a more complex view of firm
inclusion that relies heavily on agency principles. Second, Coase did not
address the division of the entrepreneurial functions among separate actors.
Therefore, he did not need to determine a boundary for the firm if that firm
separated management and risk bearing functions. In the nexus of
contracts view, risk bearers, managers, employees, suppliers, and
customers are all part of the web of explicit and implicit contracts that
make up the firm. No subset of this group is categorically separate from
the rest.
C. The Single Entity Concept from Coasean and Nexus of Contracts
Perspectives
The single entity concept under Section One of the Sherman Act
creates a rule of per se legality for agreements between individuals within
the firm. An agreement between the firm and another actor, such as a
supplier or a customer, is subject to scrutiny under Section One. This
categorical separation between agreements among actors within the firm
(ignored under Section One) and agreements between the firm and actors
outside the firm (assessed under Section One) fits naturally in the Coasean
perspective. Of course, Coase was not addressing analysis under Section
One of the Sherman Act when he wrote his article. He was instead trying
to analyze why firms exist and what determines their size. However, his
perspective that there is something conceptually different about conduct
within a firm and conduct outside the firm is consistent with the single
entity concept of Section One. Both Coase and the single entity concept
treat the line between the firm and the market as conceptually sound.
The nexus of contracts approach rejects the importance of the line
between actors within a firm and those outside the firm. The nexus of
contracts approach treats suppliers and customers as part of the same web
of explicit and implicit contracts as stockholders, directors, officers, and
employees. Under this approach, the employer’s control over the employee
109. Id. at 290.
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is not categorically different from the control exercised by any buyer over
any seller. Similarly, the firm has no owner who is categorically different
from any other actor in the web of explicit and implicit contracts.
Stockholders are merely suppliers of capital and risk bearing services. In
this sense, they are not categorically different than suppliers of any other
input.
Because the nexus of contracts approach rejects the categorical
distinction between actors inside and outside the firm, it calls into question
the single entity concept. If there is no categorical difference between
actors inside and outside the firm, why should agreements among actors
“inside” the firm and agreements between the firm and others be treated as
categorically different? Why should agreements among actors inside the
firm be ignored, while those between the firm and other actors be subject to
scrutiny under Section One of the Sherman Act?
Rejecting the single entity concept would take the language of Section
One literally. All agreements which restrain trade would be subject to
scrutiny under Section One, whether those agreements were among
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees of a firm or between the
firm and other actors such as suppliers and customers. An assessment of
the competitive consequences of the agreements would replace the rule of
per se legality flowing from the single entity concept. The rejection of that
rule would be in accord with the historical trend in which the Supreme
Court has reduced the number of per se rules.110
In such a hypothetical world, the rules governing scrutiny under
Section One would need to be substantially revised. An intra-firm
agreement among plant managers that the products produced by each plant
are to sell at the same price would not be per se illegal price fixing. In
applying the rule of reason, one of the factors considered would need to be
whether the agreement included only actors within a firm. Nevertheless,
rejection of the rule of per se legality embodied in the single entity concept
would substantially increase the number of agreements subject to scrutiny
under Section One. Whether this is favorable depends on one’s confidence
in the rule of reason. While the Supreme Court seems very confident in the
rule of reason when it rejects or limits rules of per se illegality, it is not at
all clear that this confidence should lead to the rejection of the rule of per
se legality at the foundation of the single entity concept.
One could retain the single entity concept based on one or more of
several theoretical foundations. First, one could conclude that Coase was
right, that control of employees by an employer is categorically different
from other agreements. This conclusion has several difficulties for
110. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15 (describing the Supreme Court’s
reduction in the number of agreements it subjects to per se illegality).
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purposes of retaining and applying the single entity concept. First, it
ignores the power of the intellectual insights found in the nexus of
contracts perspective. Second, it leaves unaddressed the issues raised by
the separation of various aspects of the entrepreneurial role. It does not
help in understanding how one should apply the single entity concept to
shareholders and managers of a business entity. These are the very
problems posed in cases such as Copperweld and American Needle.
A second theoretical basis for retaining the single entity concept is to
conclude that the nexus of contracts perspective is right, but there are still
reasons to retain the single entity concept for purposes of Section One of
the Sherman Act. The scholars who developed the nexus of contracts
perspective did so for purposes of understanding the economics of business
associations and developing rules for their governance. They were not
addressing the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act governs competition in
markets, but does not expressly address the governance of business
associations. It is possible that the nexus of contracts perspective on the
firm is correct, but there are still Sherman Act policies that lead to the
conclusion that the single entity concept should be retained as a rule of per
se legality.
Rules established under Section One of the Sherman Act attempt to
assess the competitive effects of agreements. The rule of reason explicitly
addresses the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of agreements.
Rules of per se illegality are based on the conclusion that particular types
of agreements are so likely to be net anticompetitive that it is not worth the
effort of assessment under the rule of reason. Similarly, the rule of per se
legality embodied in the single entity concept could be based on the
conclusion that certain types of agreements among shareholders, directors,
officers, and employees of a corporation are so likely net procompetitive
that assessment under the rule of reason is not worth the effort. The
question is what would be the basis for such a conclusion.
IV. SHARING NET PROFITS AND EXERTING SIGNIFICANT CONTROL JUSTIFY
SINGLE ENTITY TREATMENT
The single entity concept legalizes agreements among owners and
employees. The nexus of contracts perspective divides ownership
functions into supply of capital, risk taking, and management services.
Some suppliers of capital take limited risk and exert limited management
because they are holders of debt. Holders of debt take limited risk since
they receive a return that does not depend on the venture making a profit.111
111. At some point, the insolvency of the venture would affect payment of principal and
interest to debt holders.
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Holders of debt have a limited role in management. Loan agreements often
place limits on the activities of the borrower, but do not usually give the
debt holder discretionary power. Owners of equity securities supply capital
and take more risk than debt holders take. Owners of equity securities also
have more management power than debt holders have. Owners of equity
securities in corporations elect directors who oversee management. One
question raised by the single entity concept is whether the risk bearing
service provided by owners of equity justifies per se legality for
agreements related to that risk bearing service. This question is analyzed in
subpart A.
Owners of equity securities exercise some level of control over
managers, and managers exercise extensive control over employees. The
nexus of contracts perspective questions whether this level of control is
meaningfully different from control exercised by any buyer over any seller.
The single entity concept leads to the conclusion that agreements among
owners, managers, and employees are per se lawful. Subpart B analyzes
whether the control exercised over employees justifies this treatment.
A. Sharing Net Profits Induces Cost Savings Sufficient to Justify
Single Entity Treatment
Owners of a firm are the residual claimants to the firm’s net profits.
The default rules for sharing net profits vary among different types of
business organizations, and there are various levels of management
authority.112 Private ordering often alters these default rules. Despite the
variance in default rules and private ordering, sharing net profits induces
cost savings. Net profits are calculated by subtracting expenses from
revenue. Actors who share net profits have incentives to increase revenue
and decrease costs. These incentives justify single entity treatment.
Actors who are residual claimants to the net profits of a firm are
deemed part of a single entity with respect to all activities that give rise to
those profits. There is a basic difference between actors who share net
profits and those who do not. For example, imagine two actors who want
to cooperate in a business venture. One owns the building that the venture
will use. The other will provide knowledge and labor to the venture. One
possible arrangement would be for the building owner to rent the building
to the person providing the labor. The rent could be a fixed dollar amount
per month or a percentage of the gross revenue of the business. Another
possibility would be for the two actors to form a business organization in
112. Shareholders of corporations have relatively little control. Partners in a general
partnership share extensive control. Members of limited liability companies have varying
levels of control depending on whether the company is member managed or manager
managed.
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which they would share profits. This business organization could be a
corporation in which they are both shareholders, a limited liability
company in which they are both members, or a partnership.
In the landlord/tenant relationship, each of the actors would try to
maximize their own returns. Neither the property owner nor the tenant has
an interest in increasing the returns of the other.113 Each would bargain for
higher or lower rent. More importantly, each would try to extract the
maximum from the other in other terms of performance. The tenant would
try to get the highest level of service out the property owner. The property
owner would try to provide the cheapest level of service. Neither has an
interest in reducing the costs of the other.114 It is of course possible to try to
predict the consequences of this divergence of interest and bargain to an
efficient result. However, given the bounded rationality of the actors, such
a prediction is sometimes difficult.
The formation of a business organization in which both parties are coowners alters the interests of the actors in important ways. Both actors will
still try to maximize their own returns.115 However, since they are sharing
net profits, they each have an interest in maximizing the revenue produced
by the venture, and more importantly, minimizing costs. Unlike the
property owner/tenant relationship where costs are borne individually, in
the business organization context, the owners deduct costs from revenues
before sharing the resulting net profit. Therefore, both parties have an
incentive to improve the efficiency by reducing costs.
The property owner/tenant scenario and the business organization
scenario merit different treatment under Section One of the Sherman Act,
because they have materially different incentives for reducing costs. One
way of implementing different treatment would be to say that agreements
are present in both scenarios and assess the competitive effects of the
agreements under the rule of reason and any per se rule if applicable. This
would allow and require the trier of fact to determine the competitive
effects of the differing incentives for cost reduction on a case-by-case
basis. Another way of implementing the different treatment would be to
say that an agreement is absent in the business organization scenario and
conclude that coordinated behavior is per se lawful. This is the approach
that the single entity fiction promotes.
Three Supreme Court cases show how Section One has been applied
to scenarios involving varying levels of sharing of revenues and profits.
Although each of these cases was nominally addressed to whether conduct
113. Each actor would have an interest in the other remaining solvent and able to
perform.
114. The statement in the text assumes that the financial terms of the lease would not
reflect the cost reductions.
115. For example, each will try to negotiate a larger share of the net profits.
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was per se illegal or subject to the rule of reason, their facts demonstrate
the importance of revenue/profit sharing on the assessment of competitive
effects. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,116 doctors acting
through their local medical associations agreed to accept a set of maximum
payments for designated services provided to patients insured by certain
insurance plans.117 Arizona sued, alleging that the agreement was per se
illegal price fixing. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on
liability and the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion.118 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court order concluding that the alleged
agreement was not per se illegal and its competitive effects would need to
be determined.119 The Supreme Court held that the agreement was per se
illegal and that the district court should have granted summary judgment to
the plaintiff.120 The Court focused on the lack of risk sharing by the
doctors:
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other joint
arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well
as the opportunities for profit. In such joint ventures, the
partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with other
sellers in the market. The agreement under attack is an
agreement among hundreds of competing doctors concerning the
price at which each will offer his own services to a substantial
number of consumers. It is true that some are surgeons, some
anesthesiologists, and some psychiatrists, but the doctors do not
sell a package of three kinds of services. If a clinic offered
complete medical coverage for a flat fee, the cooperating doctors
would have the type of partnership arrangement in which a
price-fixing agreement among the doctors would be perfectly
proper. But the fee agreements disclosed by the record in this
case are among independent competing entrepreneurs. They fit
squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold.121
Thus, the Court imposed the per se rule because the doctors were not
sharing the risks that revenues would be low or expenses high. The Court
indicated that if the doctors had shared these risks, single entity treatment
would have been appropriate. In Maricopa, the parties to the agreement
shared neither revenues nor costs. In an earlier case, the Court held that an
arrangement in which competitors shared revenues but not costs should be
assessed under the rule of reason.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

457 U.S. 332 (1982).
Id. at 339-341.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337-338.
Id. at 348-349.
Id. at 356-57.
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In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
(“BMI”), copyright holders combined to offer a blanket license to
copyrighted music.122 Under the terms of the blanket license, a licensee
could perform all of the copyrighted music of the copyright holders.
Individual licenses to particular works were available from individual
copyright holders at prices determined unilaterally by each copyright
holder. The plaintiff claimed that the creation and pricing of the blanket
license constituted per se illegal price fixing, and the court of appeals
agreed.123 The Supreme Court reversed and held that the creation and
pricing of the blanket license was subject to the rule of reason rather than
the per se rule.124 Unlike the doctors in Maricopa, the copyright holders
were not merely pricing a product that they individually produced. Rather,
the copyright holders created a different product, the blanket license. No
individual copyright holder could offer a license to millions of copyrights.
This difference justified applying the rule of reason rather than the per se
rule against price fixing. However, the copyright holders were not sharing
the risk that costs would exceed revenues. The copyright holders were
sharing the revenues from the blanket license, and ASCAP incurred some
costs in administering the blanket license and enforcing the rights of the
copyright holders. But copyright holders did not share the costs incurred in
creating the copyrighted works. This meant that some copyright holders
could make money while others lost money. No copyright holder had an
interest in lowering costs incurred by other copyright holders. They were
not residual claimants who shared the risk that profits would be low or
losses high. This meant that they were not deemed to be a single entity
whose actions were per se lawful under Section One. Of course, many of
the actions of the copyright holders acting through ASCAP or BMI could
be lawful under the rule of reason; however, they were not shielded from
assessment by the single entity rule.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Dahger125 the Court faced a situation where the
sharing of net profits would justify single entity treatment. As in Maricopa
and BMI, the issue before the Court was whether the defendants’ conduct
was subject to the per se rule against price fixing.126 In Maricopa, the
defendant doctors shared neither revenues nor costs and the Court applied
the per se rule. In BMI, the copyright holders shared revenues but not
costs, and the Court rejected the application of the per se rule in favor of
the rule of reason. In Dahger, the parties to the agreement shared both
revenues and costs of their joint activities. While the Court was only called
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 24-25.
547 U.S. 1 (2006).
Id. at 5.
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upon to decide whether the per se rule applied, it implied that single entity
treatment would be appropriate.
Dahger involved a joint venture between Texaco and Shell. Texaco
and Shell had historically competed in the refining and sale of gasoline.127
In 1998, Texaco and Shell formed a joint venture to pool their resources for
refining and selling gasoline. Under the terms of the joint venture, Texaco
and Shell shared the risk and profits from the venture.128 The joint venture
sold its gasoline under the original Texaco and Shell trademarks. The
plaintiffs “alleg[ed] that, by unifying gasoline prices under the two brands,
petitioners had violated the per se rule against price fixing . . . .”129 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It concluded
that the rule of reason applied to the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiffs
asserted only a per se claim.130 In holding that the per se rule against price
fixing did not apply to the defendants’ conduct, the Supreme Court focused
on the sharing of risk of losses and opportunities for profits by the
defendants, and invoked the single entity concept:
These cases do not present [a per se illegal] agreement, however,
because Texaco and Shell Oil did not compete with one another
in the relevant market —namely, the sale of gasoline to service
stations in the western United States — but instead participated
in that market jointly through their investments in Equilon. In
other words, the pricing policy challenged here amounts to little
more than price setting by a single entity — albeit within the
context of a joint venture — and not a pricing agreement between
competing entities with respect to their competing products.
Throughout Equilon’s existence, Texaco and Shell Oil shared in
the profits of Equilon’s activities in their role as investors, not
competitors.
When “persons who would otherwise be
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well
as the opportunities for profit . . . such joint ventures [are]
regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the
market.” As such, though Equilon’s pricing policy may be price
fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust sense.
(“When two partners set the price of their goods or services they
are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of
the Sherman Act”).131
The Court’s invocation of the single entity concept was dicta because
127. Id. at 3-4.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 5-6 (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356
(1982); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)) (internal
footnote omitted).
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the only issue before the Court was whether the per se rule against price
fixing applied to the defendants’ conduct. In one passage, the Court
mentioned both the single entity concept and stated that the plaintiffs could
have challenged the defendants’ behavior under the rule of reason:
As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have
the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells,
including the discretion to sell a product under two different
brands at a single, unified price. If Equilon’s price unification
policy is anticompetitive, then respondents should have
challenged it pursuant to the rule of reason.132
In a footnote to that passage, the Court noted that since the plaintiffs had
not asserted a rule of reason argument, it need not address the possibility
that Section One did not apply to the joint venture because of the single
entity concept.133 Therefore, while the Court in Dahger noted the
possibility of single entity treatment for the joint venture and focused on
the sharing of profits and losses, its holding is limited to the determination
that the per se rule was not applicable to the defendants’ conduct.134
The single entity theory treats concerted behavior among co-owners of
a business organization as unilateral only when it is directed toward the
generation of net profits to be shared by the co-owners. Concerted
behavior that is unconnected with the firm, or that affects profits not shared
with the other co-owners, is not protected by the single entity theory.135 For
example, in Dagher, Texaco and Shell combined their gasoline refining
132. Id. at 7.
133. See id. at n.2 (“Respondents have not put forth a rule of reason claim.
Accordingly, we need not address petitioners’ alternative argument that § 1 of the Sherman
Act is inapplicable to joint ventures.”) (internal citation omitted).
134. Commentators have struggled with what Dagher means for the single entity
concept, particularly post American Needle. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher
R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 865-67 (2011) (arguing that
the Supreme Court was careless to reference the single entity question in Dagher); Daniel R.
Shulman, Another View of American Needle, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 261, 265-69 (2011)
(arguing that Dagher does not provide guidance on when joint ventures should receive
single entity treatment); Gregory J. Werden, The Application of the Sherman Act to Joint
Ventures: The Law After American Needle, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 251, 256-58 (2011)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dagher only makes sense if it is viewed as a
variation on the single entity idea).
135. See generally, Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 134 at 855 (“When a single entity
is set up by the participants in order to control their actual or potentially separate business
interests, as in American Needle, then there are multiple entities capable of conspiring for
antitrust purposes . . . . Suppose two separate firms create a joint venture and each owns
half. Depending on how it is structured and presented, a joint venture may appear to be
single entity with its own name, logo, product, etc. However, for antitrust purposes, the
joint venture is a product of concerted action, and actions by the venture management that
limit the separate business of each firm are conspiratorial to the extent they limit
competition that could otherwise have occurred.”).
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and marketing, and shared profits and losses. Pricing the resulting gasoline
was part of the activity that gave rise to the shared profits or losses. Single
entity treatment for this activity is justified. However, if Texaco and Shell
also agreed about the price they would charge for home heating oil, this
agreement would not be subject to single entity treatment.136 This is so
because Texaco and Shell would not be sharing profits and losses on home
heating oil and thus would have no incentive to reduce each other’s costs.
Similarly, the joint venture agreement contemplated that both Texaco and
Shell would cease refining and selling gasoline individually. Ceasing
individual production and sale of gasoline does not itself generate any
shared profits or losses. Therefore, the agreement to cease individual
production and sale of gasoline is not protected by the single entity
concept. Its competitive effects will be assessed under Section One.
This analysis is different from the familiar conclusion that the
formation of a joint venture is subject to Section One scrutiny even if its
operations are governed by the single entity concept. The formation of a
joint venture is subject to Section One because at the moment of the
agreement, the agreeing parties have not begun sharing net profits and are
pursuing their own separate interests.137 The analysis in the preceding
paragraph does not depend on the timing of the agreement. Rather, it
depends on whether the challenged activity generates shared net profits or
losses. An agreement to fix the price of home heating oil would not
generate such profits and losses, nor would an agreement to refrain from
individually producing and selling gasoline. However, just because both
such agreements are subject to assessment under Section One does not
mean that the assessment would reach the same conclusion. The price
fixing agreement would be per se illegal. Courts would assess the
agreement to cease individual production and sale of gasoline under the
rule of reason and it would presumably be lawful.138
In summary, the sharing of net profits or losses justifies single entity
treatment for all activities generating those profits or losses. This is
because sharing profits or losses incentivizes cost savings. However,
single entity treatment extends only to activities generating the shared
profits or losses and not to other activities of the parties. The competitive
effects of those other agreements will be assessed under a per se rule or the
rule of reason as appropriate. Sharing profits or losses is not the only basis
for single entity treatment.

136. Indeed, such an agreement would be per se illegal price fixing.
137. The same can be said of a merger.
138. The joint venture in Dagher had been approved in a consent decree with the
Federal Trade Commission and the attorneys general of several states. Dagher, 547 U.S. at
4.
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B. When One Person Substantially Controls the Activities of Another
They Will Be Considered a Single Entity
Single entity treatment is not only for those who share net profits.
Employees of a firm who are acting to further their employer’s interests are
considered part of the firm. Analyzing why this is so will help determine
the scope of single entity treatment for other actors cooperating with a firm.
It is first important to note why employees are not covered by the rule
analyzed in the prior section about actors sharing net profits. Employees
are paid by their employers. However, employers pay their employees
regardless of whether the employer is making or losing money. 139
Therefore, employees do not share in the risk of losses. Employees, like
most other suppliers of inputs to the firm, receive payments that are
expenses to the firm rather than a distribution of profits.
If employees are input suppliers who do not share in the risk of profits
or losses, why are they considered part of the single entity along with those
who share net profits? Other input suppliers are not considered part of the
entity. Landlords, lenders, licensors of intellectual property, and sellers of
all sorts of property and services are all separate entities capable of
agreement with their tenants, borrowers, licensees, and buyers under
Section One. Why are employees different? One possible answer is that
the interests of the employee and employer are somewhat aligned, even if
they are not sharing net profits. However, other input suppliers also have
interests somewhat aligned with the firm. Landlords often receive rent
affected by the gross revenue of the tenant. Similarly, licensors of
intellectual property often receive license payments affected by the gross
revenue of the licensee. Of course, for a firm engaged in the resale of
products, its suppliers benefit when the firm sells more. Indeed, if a partial
alignment of interests sufficed to make multiple persons a single entity, an
overt cartel could be a single entity. Cartelists do not share net profits, but
they all have an interest in maintaining a high price through concerted
action. Therefore, a partial alignment of interests short of sharing net
profits does not justify single entity treatment and does not explain why
employees are treated as part of their employer’s firm.
Another possible explanation for the inclusion of employees in the
employer’s firm is that the employees owe a fiduciary duty to pursue the
interest of the employer. Further, unlike other agents, employees have a
legal duty to obey orders from the employer about how they perform
services for the employer. These are the reasons that Coase believed that
employees are categorically different from other suppliers. This difference
convinced Coase that employees were “inside” the firm and other suppliers
139. The statement in the text assumes that the employer remains solvent.
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(and customers) were “outside” the firm.
The nexus of contracts perspective rejects this conclusion. Meckling
and Jensen concluded that principals faced agency costs because agents
would be tempted to ignore their legal duties and fail to pursue the
principals’ interests by shirking and otherwise pursing the agents’
individual interests. Agency costs include the cost of monitoring the
agents’ performance, the cost of the agents “bonding” their performance,
and an irreducible cost of the agents deviating from the principals’
interests. Alchian and Demsetz believed that the control an employer had
over an employee was not different from the control any buyer had over
any seller. If an employee does not act as the employer wants, the
employer’s recourse is to fire the employee. Alchian and Demsetz point
out that any buyer can take similar recourse against any seller, i.e., refuse to
buy any more from that seller.
The employment relationship may be sufficiently different from other
supplier relationships to justify single entity treatment under Section One.
One difference between the employment relationship and relationships with
other suppliers is in the nature of the contract. Other suppliers typically
agree to supply some result. A supplier of a product agrees to supply the
product described in the contract. A nonemployee supplier of a service
agrees to supply the service described in the contract. Unless addressed in
the contract, the buyer does not have the right to tell the seller how to build
the product or supply the service. If Toyota agrees to buy tires from
Goodyear, it gets the tires and does not have the right to tell Goodyear
whether to run a night shift in the tire factory. If Toyota agrees to have an
electrical company rewire a factory, Toyota does not have the right to
specify which workers do which part of the rewiring. However, if Toyota
used its own employees to make the tires or rewire the factory, it would be
able to direct the employees with respect to the details of performing their
jobs.
The agency cost concept correctly asserts that Toyota would face
monitoring and other costs in making its employees do as directed and not
shirk. However, in dealing with third party suppliers, Toyota would face a
bigger problem. If Toyota tells the third party supplier to do something, the
supplier has the legal right to refuse. The tire supplier and the electrical
company can refuse to do what Toyota wants and still get paid.140 In
dealing with its employees, Toyota does have monitoring and other costs in
detecting shirking and other failures of performance. However, if Toyota
overcomes these costs and detects the employee’s deviation, it can fire the
employee. The employee cannot shirk or defy Toyota’s orders and still be
140. The statement in the text assumes that the contract does not give Toyota the right to
give the order.
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paid. Employees might sometimes get away with shirking, but they do not
have the right to shirk.
In one sense, this is just to say that Coase was right. The employment
relationship might be categorically different from relationships with other
suppliers. The legal right of the employer to tell the employee what to do
allows the employer to make adaptations ex post rather than being stuck
with an ex ante bargain. With other suppliers of goods and services, the
firm bargains ex ante for various contractual rights. If circumstances
change, the firm cannot adjust the bargain without the consent of the
supplier. With employees, ex post adjustments are possible. It is, of
course, true that the employee can quit if he or she does not consent to the
employer’s directives. However, the employee cannot refuse the directives
and keep his or her job. If nonemployee suppliers are on very short term
contracts, this distinction might not make much of a difference. The
nonemployee supplier with a short-term contract does have the benefit of
its bargain and can assert its contractual rights. However, in a very shortterm contract the benefit of the bargain does not last very long. Like an
employee, the nonemployee supplier who refuses to accept the directive of
the buyer does so at the risk of losing its continuing relationship with the
firm, i.e. being “fired.”
It is possible that employees will be more willing to accept adaptation
by employers than nonemployee suppliers with short-term contracts.
Employees typically make the bulk of their income from their employment.
Nonemployee suppliers typically do not make the bulk of their income
from one customer. In situations where a seller makes the bulk of his or
her income from one source, adjusting to the termination of the relationship
is more costly than adjusting to the loss of one of many customers. In a
sense, the seller has invested in an undiversified portfolio. In such a
situation, the employee/seller is more dependent on the single source of
income and may be more willing to follow the demands of the employer for
midterm adaptation.
It is also possible that agency costs will be lower in an employment
relationship than in a nonemployee setting. Agency costs include the cost
to the principal of monitoring the agent’s conduct to determine if the agent
is shirking or otherwise not pursuing the interests of the principal. It is
possible that these monitoring costs are lower in the employment setting
than with nonemployee suppliers. Employees often are performing tasks
that the employer is familiar with. These tasks are often performed on the
employer’s premises. They are often performed in the presence of
supervisors. They are often directed at goals that are very specific and
short-term. If the goal is not accomplished, the employer can easily and
quickly detect it. If an employee is directed to wash a window, the
employer will easily and quickly detect if the employee has complied with
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the order. All of these characteristics of employment make it easier to
monitor employees than nonemployee suppliers and thus make it more
likely that employees will do as the employers direct.
The contractual right of an employer to direct an employee, the greater
willingness of employees to accept midterm adaptations by the employer,
and the increased effectiveness of monitoring by employers justify the rule
of per se legality that is the foundation of the single entity concept.
C. The Relationship of the Sharing of Profits Test and the Control
Test
The sharing of net profits test analyzed in Part A above concludes that
parties who share net profits should be treated as a single entity for all
agreements related to the production of those net profits. The control test
analyzed in Part B above concludes that employers and their employees
should be treated as a single entity for all agreements in which the
employees are following the directions of the employers to advance the
employers’ interests. In an important respect, the control test is dependent
on the sharing of net profits test.
The control test does not exist as a separate justification for single
entity treatment. Control alone is not sufficient to justify single entity
treatment.141 Control by a party with the incentive to reduce costs and
maximize net profits is required. If the controlling party does not have the
incentive to reduce costs and increase revenues, thereby maximizing net
profits, the control does not justify single entity treatment. For example, in
an overt cartel, the cartel members might agree to obey the directions of
one person with respect to what quantity to produce and what price to
charge. The cartel members might even agree that the controlling person
could tell them how to produce the cartelized product. Although control
would be present, the single entity conclusion would not be appropriate.
This is because cartel members do not share net profits and therefore do not
have an incentive to reduce each other’s costs. Similarly, the person given
control by the cartel members does not share the costs of all of the cartel
members and therefore does not have the incentive an owner does to reduce
costs and maximize net profits.
The control test concludes that employees are part of the employer’s
firm because the employer is seeking to maximize net profits. In the
simplest situation, the employer is a sole proprietor, i.e., a single living
individual. If the sole proprietor has no employees and conducts all of his

141. For an argument that control through ownership should be the determining criterion
of single entity analysis, see Benjamin Klein, Single Entity Analysis of Joint Ventures After
American Needle, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2013).
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or her business alone, the single entity fiction does not come into play.
When the sole proprietor hires an employee, the single entity question
arises. Although the employer and the employee are two people agreeing
as to various aspects of the business, should courts treat them as a single
person? The sharing of net profits test does not come into play, because the
sole proprietor retains all net profits after paying expenses, including the
wages of the employees. The control test comes into play because the
employer controls the conduct of the employee. The single entity
conclusion is appropriate because the employer has the incentive to reduce
costs and increase revenue and is controlling the conduct of the employee
to accomplish that end.
When an employer has more than one owner sharing net profits, single
entity treatment remains appropriate. The inclusion of more than one
person sharing net profit does not alter the conclusion. Treating all persons
sharing net profits as falling within the fictional single entity is justified by
the shared incentive to reduce costs and maximize net profits. This is true
even though the various owners do not control each other. The control of
the owners over the employees justifies inclusion of all of the owners and
all of the employees in the single entity because the people with the correct
incentives control the people who do not share these incentives. In short,
the single entity should include all of the people with the incentive to
reduce costs and maximize net profits and all of the people they control.
D. Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Testing the Tests
A difficult and unresolved problem for the single entity theory is the
treatment of an agreement between a parent corporation and a partially
owned subsidiary. This issue was explicitly left unresolved by the Court in
Copperweld.142 In approaching this problem, it is useful to recall the issues
that are resolved. If two corporations, A and B, each make five percent of
the sales in an otherwise highly fractionalized market, an agreement
between A and B will be assessed under Section One of the Sherman Act.
The agreement would be per se illegal if it fixed prices or allocated
customers.143 If the agreement is not subject to a per se rule, it will be
142. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)
(“We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring
with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.”).
143. The per se rule would apply even though the parties had a relatively small
combined market share. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
224 n.59 (1940) (“[A] conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 of the Act . . . though it is not
established that the conspirators had the means available for accomplishment of their
objective . . . .” ).
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assessed under the rule of reason and could be legal if it enhanced
competition. An acquisition of one firm by the other would, of course, be
an agreement subject to Section One (and Section Seven of the Clayton
Act).144 However, given the highly fractionalized market and the relatively
small market shares of the parties, the acquisition will likely be lawful.145
Subsequent to the acquisition, the single entity concept will preclude
further assessment of the behavior of the combined firm. If the acquisition
takes the form of a merger, one of the corporations will cease to exist, and
after the acquisition, the single entity concept will prevent further
assessment of the activities of the combined firm under Section One.146 If
the acquisition takes the form of a stock acquisition by A of all of the
shares of B, B will become a wholly owned subsidiary of A. Copperweld
will treat A and B as a single entity precluding further assessment of the
actions of A and B under Section One. However, what if the acquisition is
a partial stock acquisition? What if A acquires only 60% of the shares of
B? Should A and B be viewed as a single entity in this situation?
How would the sharing of net profits test treat an agreement between a
parent corporation and its partially owned subsidiary? A and all of the
other shareholders of B would share in the net profits generated by B.
Therefore, the single entity concept would protect agreements related to the
operation of B. These agreements would include decisions about what
products B will produce, what B will charge for those products, and where
they will be sold. This conclusion flows from the assumption that all of the
shareholders of B have an interest in maximizing the profits of B, in which
they all share. The single entity concept would not protect agreements
restricting the activities of A or any of the other shareholders of B, because
those agreements do not relate solely to the activities giving rise to the net
profits shared.147 Agreements between A and B that restrict what A could
produce, how much it could charge, or where it could sell, would be
assessed under Section One. Therefore, the question under the sharing of
net profits test is not simply whether a parent and a partially owned
subsidiary are capable of conspiring. The sharing of net profits test should
also be applied in order to distinguish between agreements about the
activities generating the net profits and agreements restricting other
activities.
Should A’s control of B by means of its majority ownership alter the
144. 15 U.S.C. 18 (2006).
145. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES §5.3 (2010) (“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have
adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis.”).
146. Courts could assess exclusionary actions of the surviving firm under Section Two
if the firm acquired or became dangerously close to acquiring monopoly power.
147. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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conclusion that agreements about the activities of B are protected by the
single entity concept? Alternatively, should A’s control of B alter the
conclusion that agreements about the operation of A should not be
protected by the single entity concept? As a threshold matter, it is
important to recognize that applying the control test does not determine
these questions. As discussed in the preceding part C, the control test
applies to actors controlled by those who are sharing in the net profits of
the entity. It concludes that employees of a firm are part of the firm for
purposes of Section One because they are controlled by the actor or actors
who have the incentive to reduce costs and maximize profits within the
firm. In the case of a partially owned subsidiary, the controlling parent
corporation is not the entire group of actors who share in the net profits.
Therefore, the control test does not apply because the controlling party
does not have identical interests to the group of the actors who are sharing
net profits.148 Since the control test does not apply, the issue depends on
the application of the sharing of net profits test. As noted above, the
application of the sharing of net profits test would ordinarily lead to two
conclusions: first, that all agreements about the activities related to the
generation of the net profits are protected by the single entity concept; and
second, that agreements restricting the activities of the controlling parties
are not protected by the single entity concept. The question is whether the
control by the majority shareholding parent should alter these conclusions.
The conclusion that the single entity concept protects agreements
related to the generation of shared net profits is called into question by
agency cost analysis when one member of the controlling group exercises
control. It has been argued that the control exercised by a majority parent
should lead to the conclusion that the controlling parent and the partially
owned subsidiary should be treated as a single entity for purposes of
Section One.149 However, agency cost analysis suggests the opposite
conclusion: the majority shareholding parent could have the incentive to
cause the subsidiary to operate at a sub-optimal level to protect the interests
of the parent corporation. The controlling parent could cause the partially
owned subsidiary to forego profitable transactions that would benefit the
shareholders of the subsidiary because it would cost the parent. For
example, imagine that the subsidiary has the opportunity to expand
geographically into a territory traditionally served by the parent
corporation. The incremental sales in the new territory would earn the
subsidiary $100 in net profits but cost the parent corporation the same
148. Further, the control test does not apply because, unlike employees, the management
of the subsidiary does not owe a legal obligation to maximize the interests of the parent
corporation rather than the entire group of shareholders of the subsidiary.
149. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 245-248 (3rd ed.
2010).
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amount in lost profits. The parent corporation has an incentive to prevent
the territorial expansion by the subsidiary because it will lose $100 but gain
only $60. It has a 100% interest in its own profits but only a 60% interest
in the profits of the subsidiary. Similarly, it may sell to the subsidiary an
input for $100 that the subsidiary could have produced itself for $90. The
subsidiary shares the $10 loss with its other shareholders, so the parent
corporation bears only $6 of it. However, the parent shares the $10 gain
with no one. The management of the subsidiary could well violate its
fiduciary duty of loyalty in making these decisions benefitting the parent at
the expense of the subsidiary.150 But agency cost analysis is based on the
assumption that the agent will sometimes yield to the temptation to seek its
own self-interest at the expense of the principal. In this situation, the
controlling parent is the agent for the group of shareholders of the
subsidiary. As an agent, it is supposed to seek the interest of the group of
which it is a member; however, it has an incentive to breach this duty. The
minority shareholders have substantial monitoring costs in detecting and
preventing this breach. These minority shareholders face a significant
information hurdle in detecting the breach. Further, seeking redress for any
breach they do detect would require a procedurally difficult derivative
suit.151
The Sherman Act is not a tool for enforcing corporate law fiduciary
duties. However, that is not the issue. The question is whether a rule of
per se legality should shield any inquiry into the competitive effects of
agreements between the parent corporation and the partially owned
subsidiary. Per se legality is justified when the group who shares the net
profits also controls the activities generating those profits. Is it justified
when only one member of the group controls those activities, or does the
potential for increased agency costs mean that a rule of per se legality
should not be applied? In the preceding example involving potential
territorial expansion by the subsidiary, in a world with no agency costs, the
subsidiary would expand into the parent corporation’s territory. The
consumers would benefit from the competition between the two
corporations. However, if agency costs prevent this competition from
occurring, should the single entity concept deem this outcome per se
lawful? The sharing of net profits test would conclude that the single entity
concept should apply. A potential deficiency in the test is that it relies on
the assumption that agency problems arising among the group sharing in
the net profits will be overcome by effective business associations law. It
150. Id. at 233.
151. For discussions of shareholder demand requirements and the potential motion to
dismiss by a special litigation committee, see Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254-55 (Del.
2000), Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932-35 (Del. 1993), and Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981).
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is not obvious that this assumption is warranted.
The analysis in the preceding paragraph questions whether the normal
outcome of the sharing of net profits test, protecting governance decisions
directed at the activities giving rise to the shared net profits, should apply
in the context of a partially owned subsidiary. The second question is
whether the conclusion that agreements restricting the outside activities of
the parties sharing in the net profits are subject to assessment under Section
One should be altered when one of those parties controls the activities
giving rise to the net profits. Imagine two easy cases. First, if two
corporations, A and B, are unaffiliated competitors each making five
percent of the sales in a highly fractionalized market, an agreement
between A and B about what prices they will charge is illegal. Second, if A
buys one percent of the stock of B, an agreement between A and B about
what prices they will charge remains illegal. In this case, the sharing of net
profits test would allow A to participate in the governance of B by voting
for its directors. If a representative of A is elected to the board of directors
of B, that representative could lawfully participate in deliberations of the
board regarding how much B should charge for its products. However, the
mere fact that A holds one percent of the shares of B would not mean that
an agreement between A and B about how much both A and B would
charge for their products would be automatically lawful. The shareholders
of A and the shareholders of B are two different groups sharing two
different pools of net profits. They are not a single group sharing an
incentive to minimize a single set of costs yielding a single set of net
profits. This conclusion does not change as the percentage of stock in B
held by A increases, until it reaches 100%. At that point, there is only one
group of claimants sharing one set of net profits, and they would be treated
as a single entity under Copperweld.
Does it make a difference if the percent of stock held by A gives it
control of B? It does not.152 A’s controlling B does not mean that an
agreement restricting the activities of A should be protected by the single
entity concept. As discussed in part C above, control is not a separate and
sufficient test for single entity status. Control of employees by an
employer justifies including employees in the same entity with the
employer. However, this conclusion does not flow merely from control.
The employer is a group of actors who share in net profits and therefore
have the incentive to minimize costs and maximize net profits. This
incentive coupled with the employer’s control over the employees justifies
single entity treatment. However, control by itself does not justify single

152. Others have argued that it does. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 149, at
246 (“The possible dividing lines are substantial ownership, majority ownership, or de facto
control.”).
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entity treatment. Here, the control of the partially owned subsidiary by the
parent does not meet the requirement that the controlling party shares the
net profits. The controlling parent is only one of multiple parties sharing in
the net profits generated by the subsidiary. Its interests diverge from the
group sharing in the net profits generated by the subsidiary.153 This
divergence means that the controlling party is not the group sharing in the
net profits, and, therefore, it does not meet the relevant requirement.
Without the controlling group sharing in net profits, garden-variety control
is irrelevant.
V. COPPERWELD AND AMERICAN NEEDLE UNDER THE SHARING OF
PROFITS AND CONTROL TESTS
In both Copperweld and American Needle, the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether groups should be treated as single entities for
purposes of Section One of the Sherman Act. In Copperweld, the Court
concluded that application of the single entity fiction was proper.154 In
American Needle, the Court reached the opposite conclusion.155 Both of
these conclusions are consistent with the layered application of the sharing
of profits test and the control test.
In Copperweld, the Court faced the question of whether a wholly
owned subsidiary should be included in the same entity as the parent
corporation for purposes of Section One. This question is addressed to
three different types of agreements. First, the agreement might only affect
the activities of the subsidiary. For example, the agreement might limit
where the subsidiary could operate, what it could sell and/or how much it
could charge. Second, the agreement might only affect the activities of the
parent corporation for such matters. Finally, the agreement could affect the
activities of both corporations.
In addressing the question of the single entity status of a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, it is useful to remember how
the sharing of profits test and the control test assess agreements involving
only one corporation. The sharing of profits test would include all holders
of equity securities as part of the fictional single entity. This is so because
all of these parties share net profits and therefore have a shared incentive to
reduce costs and maximize the shared net profits. Of course, the single
entity fiction applies only to agreements respecting the activities that give
rise to the shared net profits. The control test leads to the conclusion that
all employees of the corporation should be included in the fictional single

153. See supra text accompanying notes 149-151.
154. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 752 (1984).
155. Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010).
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entity for all agreements where the employees are furthering the interests of
the employing corporation. This is so for two reasons. First, the employer
has an incentive to reduce costs and maximize net profits, and second, the
employer controls the activities of the employees.
In the Copperweld scenario, the alleged agreement includes both the
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary. The addition of a
wholly owned subsidiary does not change the outcome under the sharing of
net profits test and the control test. Under the sharing of net profits test, the
creation of a wholly owned subsidiary does not alter the parties who are
sharing net profits. If the subsidiary is wholly owned, the parent
corporation owns all of its equity securities. Therefore, no one other than
the parent shares in the net profits generated by the subsidiary. The parent
corporation is of course a legal fiction. Only holders of its equity securities
share its net profits. There is only one pool of net profits from which to
share. The holders of equity securities issued by the parent corporation
have the incentive to reduce the cost of all of the activities of the parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, thereby maximizing the pool
of net profits to share.
The control test also leads to the conclusion that courts should treat
the parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as a single entity.
Because the holders of the equity securities of the parent corporation are
the only parties sharing the net profits generated by the parent corporation
and the subsidiary corporation, the control test asks whether those
shareholders control the employees of both the parent corporation and the
subsidiary corporation. The shareholders of the parent corporation elect the
directors of that corporation. The directors of the parent corporation
appoint the officers of the parent corporation, who in turn select and
supervise its employees. One of the assets of the parent corporation is the
stock of the subsidiary corporation. As the sole shareholder of the
subsidiary, the parent corporation elects its directors. This decision is
either made by the board of directors of the parent corporation or the
officers of the parent corporation under the supervision of its board. The
board of directors of the subsidiary appoints the officers of the subsidiary,
who in turn select and supervise its employees. Because the officers or
board members of the parent corporation select the board members of the
subsidiary, they can control the management of the subsidiary. If members
of the board of directors of the subsidiary attempted to defy the directives
of the management of the parent corporation, the parent corporation could
simply remove the members of the board of the subsidiary and replace
them with new board members who will do as told. To simplify this
process, the parent can simply elect its own employees as members of the
board of directors of the subsidiary. Therefore, the holders of the equity
securities of the parent corporation can control the behavior of the
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employees of the parent corporation and the employees of the subsidiary
corporation. The control test concludes that the parent corporation, the
subsidiary corporation, and the employees of both corporations should be
included in the same single entity so long as the employees are advancing
the interests of the corporations and, thus, the holders of the equity
securities of the parent corporation.
In American Needle, the Court faced the question of whether it should
consider the members of the National Football League as a single entity.
The Court unanimously held that the answer to this question was no. This
conclusion is consistent with the application of the sharing of net profits
test and the control test. One potentially confusing aspect of the
application of the sharing of net profits test and the control test to the joint
activity in American Needle is that the members of the NFL controlled the
licensing activities involved in the controversy. However, it is important to
remember that the control test applies only after the application of the
sharing of net profits test. If the controlling parties do not share net profits,
the control test is not applicable. Therefore, the analysis must start with the
application of the sharing of net profits test.
Members of the NFL did not share net profits, and therefore should
not have been deemed a single entity. The joint licensing activity of the
NFL members pooled only part of the economic activity of the members.
League members hired players and team staff, entered into stadium
agreements, sold tickets, and entered into broadcast agreements, all
separate from the joint licensing arrangement that gave rise to the
controversy in American Needle. Of course, actors do not need to pool all
of their economic activity to qualify for single entity treatment.
Shareholders of publicly held corporations typically invest only a small
part of their wealth in the corporation. If a shareholder of General Motors
also owns stock in Ford, two things are clear. First, the shareholder
qualifies for single entity treatment with all of the other shareholders of
General Motors. Second, General Motors and Ford do not qualify for
single entity treatment together, despite the existence of the common
shareholder. All of the shareholders of General Motors are sharing net
profits and all agreements related to the production of that pool of net
profits qualify for single entity treatment. This is true even though each of
the shareholders has other investments and economic activities. Single
entity treatment applies to agreements giving rise to the pool of net profits
generated by General Motors, but not to other agreements.
Single entity treatment should not be denied to the joint licensing
activity involved in American Needle merely because the league members
have other economic activity that is not involved in the agreement to
engage in joint licensing. Similarly, single entity treatment should not be
denied to the joint licensing activity under the rule that single entity
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treatment extends only to agreements related to the joint production of net
profits. The agreement at issue in American Needle was the joint decision
to give an exclusive license to Reebok. This decision related directly to the
joint licensing activity. But single entity treatment should be denied to the
joint licensing activity involved in American Needle for two reasons. First,
the agreement giving rise to the joint licensing activity restricted the
activity of the league members outside the joint venture. Second, the
league members were not sharing net profits because they were not sharing
costs related to the production of the intellectual property subject to the
joint license. The facts of Dagher illustrate both of these conclusions.156
Single entity treatment in the context of joint activity applies only to
the agreements giving rise to shared profits. Single entity treatment does
not extend to agreements that limit the activity of parties outside the joint
activity.157 In Dagher, the parties to the joint venture pooled all of their
gasoline refining and distribution. They did not refine and distribute
gasoline outside the joint venture. The agreement to cease refining and
distributing gasoline outside the context of the joint venture did not qualify
for single entity treatment (although it was likely legal under the rule of
reason as reasonably related to the joint venture). Agreements about how
to refine and market the gasoline produced by the joint venture qualify for
single entity treatment because those agreements give rise to the shared net
profits.158 Similarly, if shareholders of General Motors agreed not to also
purchase stock in Ford, single entity treatment would not be appropriate for
this agreement. The agreement to refrain from buying Ford shares is not
part of the production of the shared net profits. In American Needle, the
league members agreed to license the intellectual property only jointly.
They did not retain the right to license the intellectual property individually
as well. This restriction on the separate activity of the teams is not subject
to single entity treatment because it restricts the activities of the teams
outside the context of the joint licensing activity. However, even if the
league members had not agreed to restrict their license activity outside the
joint licensing, the joint licensing would still not qualify for single entity
treatment.
The sharing of net profits justifies single entity treatment because the
parties have the incentive to reduce costs and thereby maximize net profits.
The incentive to reduce costs creates efficiencies sufficient to justify a rule
of per se legality. However, this rationale extends only to situations where
parties share all of the costs of the joint activity. In Dagher, the parties
156. See supra text accompanying notes 136 -137.
157. See supra text accompanying note 136.
158. The Court did not face this question because the only question presented to the
Court was whether the agreement was per se illegal. See supra text accompanying notes
129-132.
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shared all of the costs of the refining and distribution of gasoline. This
sharing creates an incentive to reduce costs and therefore justifies single
entity treatment. However, in American Needle the parties did not share all
of the costs of creating and licensing the intellectual property subject to the
license. The intellectual property in American Needle consisted of the
trademarks of the teams. These trademarks had value because of the
activities of the teams in playing football, and marketing live attendance
and broadcast rights. The potential purchasers of hats and tee shirts wanted
to buy the trademarked products because they liked the football teams.
They liked the football teams because of how they performed in games.
The teams did not share the costs of creating the teams and playing and
broadcasting the games. Therefore, even if the teams were sharing the
revenue from the joint licensing activities, they were not sharing net profits.
Net profits are what are left after all of the costs of production are
subtracted from revenue.159 Because the league members were not sharing
net profits and therefore did not have an incentive to reduce each other’s
costs, the rule of per se legality embodied in the single entity fiction is not
justified. Further, since the sharing of net profits test is not satisfied,
application of the control test is not required.
In summary, the layered application of the sharing of net profits test
and the control test explains the outcome in both Copperweld and
American Needle.
CONCLUSION
Although the single entity fiction fits comfortably with the Coasean
159. A cartel can be run by sharing revenue, but not costs. Cartelists can use a jointly
owned entity to make sales and share the revenue from those sales. The analysis in the text
explains the importance of sharing costs as well as revenues in single entity analysis.
Without sharing costs, single entity status is not justified. As the Court in American Needle
noted, it would be paradoxical to use the single entity concept to grant per se legality to a
cartel:
If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or losses from a venture
meant that the venture was immune from § 1, then any cartel “could evade the
antitrust law simply by creating a ‘joint venture’ to serve as the exclusive seller
of their competing products.” “So long as no agreement,” other than one made
by the cartelists sitting on the board of the joint venture, “explicitly listed the
prices to be charged, the companies could act as monopolies through the ‘joint
venture.’” (Indeed, a joint venture with a single management structure is
generally a better way to operate a cartel because it decreases the risks of a
party to an illegal agreement defecting from that agreement). However,
competitors “cannot simply get around” antitrust liability by acting “through a
third-party intermediary or ‘joint venture’.”
Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2215-16 (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v.
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335-36 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment)).
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view of the firm, that view has been called into question by the nexus of
contracts perspective. Even on its own terms, the Coasean view of the firm
does not address the firm’s boundary when the entrepreneurial functions of
supplying capital, risk bearing, and management are divided among
multiple actors. These are the scenarios that raise some of the most
difficult single entity questions under Section One.
A layered test focused on sharing net profits and exerting significant
control provides a principled basis for explaining the existence of the single
entity fiction and for analyzing its contours.

